



Bus rapid transit as a neoliberal contradiction

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ARTICLE INFO

Article history:

Received 14 October 2014
Received in revised form 10 June 2015
Accepted 18 August 2015
Available online 12 September 2015

Keywords:

Public transit
Neoliberalism
Informal economies
Global South
BRT

ABSTRACT

Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) is being implemented as a neoliberal project, but it creates contradictions that challenge the premise of neoliberalism. BRT projects are affordable rapid transit infrastructure, but they are also an impetus to restructure the urban bus sector in developing cities with informal mass transport. The dominant model of BRT implementation creates a market for bus service from large private companies where the government takes on the risk and brands the service as part of the city's attempt to be a 'world class' city that can attract mobile capital. However, BRT and the formalization of the bus sector can increase the power of urban residents by firmly putting transport in the public sphere; workers by increasing the incentives for collective action; and bus riders by prioritizing space for buses over cars. But these are only openings that require action to take advantage of the contradictions.

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1. Introduction

Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) projects are being promoted around the world, but particularly in developing countries, as affordable rapid transit infrastructure. A less expensive alternative to building urban rail transport, BRT can achieve high levels of service on dedicated bus corridors with pre-payment boarding stations and some level of transit priority. Since 2000, the number of kilometers of bus corridors has increased from just over 1000 km to over 5000 km in 2015 with 193 cities having some type of dedicated busway (BRT Centre of Excellence, EMBARQ, IEA, and SIBRT, 2015).

Much has been written about the growth of BRT and its operational challenges (Deng and Nelson, 2011; Hidalgo and Graftieaux, 2008; Hidalgo and Gutiérrez, 2013). There has also been focus on how BRT is being used to restructure the informal urban bus sector in developing cities (Ardila, 2007, 2008; Estache and Gomez-Lobo, 2005; Hook, 2005; Kaenzig et al., 2010).

In large parts of the developing world urban shared transport is provided by a large number of small vehicle owners, sometimes organized into companies or unions that control the routes, but mostly with minimal regulation by the state. Sometime the unregulated bus sector is the result of deliberate deregulation, for example Santiago, Chile under the Pinochet regime (1973–1990); but often it is the result of governments' inability to either supply adequate public service or to regulate the thousands of vehicle owners and control the cartels that develop (Paget-Seekins et al., 2015).

The under-regulated service provides a level of mobility to residents of the cities, but also generates negative externalities. The market incentives are to add buses, which increases the frequency for riders, but causes congestion due to an oversupply of buses. Since there is so much competition, there is no incentive (or financial ability) to maintain buses or purchase new buses that produce fewer emissions leading to poor air quality. In addition, drivers compete with each other for passengers on the street creating unsafe conditions and work long hours without guaranteed salary or benefits (Gilbert, 2008; Hidalgo and Graftieaux, 2008).

BRT projects are designed to address these externalities by eliminating the competition on the street, requiring low emission buses, and reducing the number of buses by increasing the size and occupancy of buses. This requires a fundamental change to the current informal sector. Small investors who own one to two old buses cannot afford or get loans for large environmentally compliant buses. In order to improve safety and end the on the street competition drivers have to be paid a salary. BRT projects often reconfigure the transit network design away from a one-seat model to a trunk and feeder model, which requires that passengers transfer. Free transfers require some sort of revenue sharing mechanism between bus operators.

This restructuring of the bus sector requires that governments either provide bus service as a public service or create a formal market from which to buy bus service. The public option has rarely been used, instead BRT projects, and more comprehensive bus formalization efforts, are creating an international market for bus operations. There is a body of literature discussing the challenges of negotiations with the existing informal operations and the design of the proper contracts (Finn and Nelson, 2002; Flores and Zegras, 2012; Paget-Seekins et al.,

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2015; Rolim et al., 2010; Walters and Cloete, 2008). Less has been written about the political-economic context of the bus formalization trend.

In this paper, I make the claim that the dominant model of BRT implementation is based on neoliberal principles, but that it also creates contradictions that challenge the premise of neoliberalism. First, I briefly discuss how I am using the term neoliberal and the potential for contradictions coming from the Global South. Then, I describe the dominant model of BRT and bus formalization efforts emanating from South America and being spread around the Global South. Finally, I use examples from a range of cities to show the openings that BRT provides to challenge neoliberal principles.

This paper is based on interviews conducted with governmental, citizen, and non-governmental leaders in Santiago, Chile; Mexico City; Delhi, and Ahmedabad, India. In addition, I reviewed media reports, planning documents, and user demographics for those cities and for Bogotá, Colombia; Quito, Ecuador; and Johannesburg, South Africa.

2. Literature review

The word neoliberal has been used to the point that some researchers are questioning its usefulness and pointing out there is a potential for discussion at cross purposes (Ferguson, 2009). The working definition has also evolved since it was originally discussed as specific types of economic reforms to a diffuse concept of all market-based governance (Lauermann and Davidson, 2013).

Clearly, the term is not monolithic and needs careful analysis within specific contexts. Market based governance does not have to imply a shrinking of the state, as markets need to be overseen by the state. It does not have to be deregulation, but can take the form of a transformed state and market relationship around a new set of interests and elites (Peck, 2004). It can include a range of practices depending on the context and can play out differently in the cities in the Global South (Bakker, 2007).

One aspect of how neoliberalism plays out in cities is the concept of entrepreneurial urban governance (Harvey, 1989). Urban governance is shifting from a model of providing services to its residents to competing with other cities to attract mobile capital. Originally, the discussion of entrepreneurial urban governance was focused on cities in the Europe and North America, but now it is being practiced by cities in the developing world as well. There has been a tendency to compare the development pattern of developing cities to developed cities, but authors are arguing for looking at the diversity of experiences with global economic trends. But the growing role of public-private partnerships in urban governance is seen as a universal experience (Shatkin, 2007).

Some authors suggest that there is a possibility for neoliberal policies to create political opportunities that are progressive, especially in cities in the Global South where we see an increase in regulation and social spending (Ferguson, 2009), or that it is possible to use neoliberal tools to reach redistributive or development ends (Parnell and Robinson, 2012). In another transportation example, congestion pricing is a market-based policy that is often proposed with redistributive outcomes in the form of increased transit spending (Chronopoulos, 2012).

A distinction can be made between the ideology and practice, but they contain a contradiction since the state is needed to structure and enforce markets and state investment in infrastructure is needed for market-driven growth. What remains to be seen is if the contradiction presents an opening for progressive or radical re-appropriation (Peck et al., 2009). Examining BRT projects in developing cities allows us to look at this potential for the power of the neoliberal contradiction within the process of formalizing informal economies.

3. The neoliberal BRT model

As discussed in the introduction BRT projects in developing cities require formalization from informal urban bus service. This formalization

is not just a secondary outcome, but is discussed by BRT proponents as a primary goal (Hidalgo and Graftieaux, 2008). Formalization of an informal economy and regulating a public service is not inherently a neoliberal proposition; in fact it is increasing the role of the state in the economy. However, the dominant model for BRT implementation, being deliberately spread around the globe, is the creation of an international market for bus service with a goal of no public funds for operating subsidies.

The push for BRT comes from South America. The concept was developed in Curitiba, Brazil, but gained international prominence after the development of the TransMilenio system in Bogotá, Colombia, which opened in 2000. The leading example of a city formalizing their entire bus network comes from Santiago, Chile. In 2007, the Chilean government created Transantiago by integrating their bus network with the city's metro system, entirely replacing the old informal system. Bogotá is now implementing a citywide formalization of their bus service, which integrates the existing informal service with the BRT network.

As Hidalgo and Gutiérrez discuss there is a range of the level of private involvement, but a public entity usually retains control over the planning of the system and the user information and private companies operate the buses and fare collection under different type of contracts (Hidalgo and Gutiérrez, 2013). The exception to this is Quito, Ecuador. Quito was an early adopter of BRT starting its first corridor in 1995 and they forced out the incumbent operators to gain control over the corridor and instituted publicly operated service (with a low fare).

The main concern for the government officials in Bogotá and Santiago was not whether to contract out the service or to publicly operate the service. In fact, publicly operating the service was not part of the public discourse surrounding these projects in either city. Rather the main concern was how to accommodate the existing informal bus operators. The response on the part of cities across Latin America has ranged from fostering to forcing cooperation (Flores and Zegras, 2012). The primary goal has been to turn the informal operators into professionalized bus companies to contract with the state to provide service.

In both Bogotá and Santiago, the government authorities contracted out the provision of bus service using area or route based monopolies. The government set up a public agency to bid out contracts to operate the service and the fare collection technology. The public agency receives the fare monies and then pays the bus operating companies using a formula primarily based on the kilometers of service they operate.

In Bogotá, the bids for operating the TransMilenio service came from Colombian companies, mostly with capital from outside of the existing bus owners. The design of the bids favored large investors (Gilbert, 2008). After the first two phases of TransMilenio, there were 13 concessions won by 5 investor groups (Paget-Seekins et al., 2015). Representatives of the workers and owners of the existing buses claimed the system turned transport into a monopoly for a few families to profit off (Porter, 2010).

TransMilenio was designed for the fare revenue to cover the operating costs. Over the life of the system, a range of 3 to 7% of the fare revenue has gone back to the government to pay for their oversight, the rest goes to the private operating and fare collection companies. The contracts for the first phase were designed to earn the operating companies 14.17% return a year, but the profits were much higher than expected, estimated between 18–22% (Gilbert, 2008).

In Santiago, the government deliberately set up the contracts in an attempt to attract foreign capital. This was partially successful. In the end, they awarded nine contracts and three have foreign interests: one was won by Colombian investors, one company added Colombian investment after the bid, and one winning company was purchased by the French passenger transport company Veolia-Transdev. The remainder were won by new companies created by existing operators (Flores Dewey, 2013).

In order to attract outside capital and access bank loans to purchase the new buses, the government took on the risk. A government official in charge of the Santiago contracting process (who incidentally afterward worked at one of the bus companies) said that they spoke to banks and investors and were told that there had to be a state guarantee, otherwise there would be no interest in participating in the system since it was new and the risk was unknown (personal communication).

In the case of Santiago, the risk was rather large, even though the system was originally designed to not need public subsidies. However, in order to provide adequate service, subsidies of up to \$50 million USD a month initially had to be added. The problems were the result of the design of the system (in part due to the no subsidy assumption) and the operating companies taking advantage of their limited risk contracts and the hampered government oversight to provide inadequate service. In the following 6 years, the contracts were renegotiated multiple times and fares increased allowing the total amount of public subsidies to be reduced and the risk shifted towards the companies (Muñoz et al., 2013). Now several of the companies claim to be in financial trouble due to these changes. However, the government of Chile has essentially accepted that they will have to spend public funds for public transport.

Proponents of the neoliberal operating model argue that using a bidding process to contract service will allocate operations to the most efficient companies who then have an incentive to innovate. However, the BRT bidding process is not taking place in a free market. The contracting occurs within the political context of government relations with existing operators. In some cases, the contracts are not even bid (Mexico City) or, as is the case of Bogotá, the contracts can end up held by a small group of connected investors. In addition, innovation is not always in the public interest. Companies innovate to maximize their profits and the case of Santiago shows how it can cost the public sector.

This model of contracting public service to private companies is a hallmark of neoliberal policy. However, unlike contracting in countries with formal transport sectors, in this case it is not the result of deregulation or reductions in public funding. Since the transition is from an informal sector with limited regulation and no (or very little) public funding, it involves an increase in the role of the state. This is not the classic neoliberal project since there is no state role to rollback or privatize; however, increasing the role of the state, especially in developing countries, is sometimes necessary for neoliberal reforms (Parnell and Robinson, 2012; Robinson, 2011). In the case of bus operations, the role of the state is creating a market for private companies by regulating the informal operators out of existence (or eliminating competing publicly operated routes), providing monopoly service contracts, and then as in the case of Santiago guaranteeing the risk with public funds.

These projects involve an increase in public funding, at least for infrastructure and in some cases operations. A substantive argument for public subsidy of public transport can be made from any number of ideological viewpoints, including one trying to optimize market efficiency (Serebrisky et al., 2009). It is unrealistic for governments to think they can formalize the sector without adding public funding, especially for complete formalization projects and not just the highest demand corridors. The process of formalization internalizes costs previously considered negative externalities. These costs included maintenance and improved environmental standards for buses, salaries and standardized working conditions for drivers, and free transfers for passengers necessary for the optimization of the network design.

Despite the increased costs, both Santiago and Bogotá designed their formalization attempts around the goal of not providing operating subsidies. The idea is the higher costs will be covered by improved efficiencies from a rationalized system. However, the new systems depend on higher fares, lower frequencies, and, in some

cases, overcrowded conditions on buses. If ridership drops to maintain operating revenues fares must increase.

Santiago was unable to complete Transantiago without including operating subsidies, although by 2015 the subsidies were 40% of the operating cost, with 13% going to cover the costs of lower fares for students. TransMilenio was able to operate without subsidies because it initially consisted only of high demand corridors. Bogotá's project (SITP) similar to Transantiago to extend the formal system to the entire city is currently behind schedule and over-budget (Cubillos Murcia, 2013). Since it seems unlikely the entire system can be implemented without public subsidies and maintains affordable fares, Bogotá with assistance from the World Bank is attempting a subsidy system targeting lower fares to lower income populations (Mehndiratta et al., 2014).

3.1. The spread of the model

Colombia and Chile have specific political and economic histories that serve as the context for this model of contracting out services. Colombia adopted neoliberal policies within the context of a violent internal conflict where union organizers were targeted by right-wing paramilitaries. Chile was famously the testing ground for neoliberal policies by the "Chicago Boys" under the Pinochet regime and even after the return to democracy most of the public services remain privatized. However, as Bogotá became the standard bearer for BRT projects around the world, its model was copied in other cities with very different political-economic histories.

The promotion of the Bogotá model of BRT comes from the international development banks and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Delegations from 37 countries came to Bogotá in the first five years to learn about their BRT system (Gilbert, 2008). Wood describes BRT policy mobilizers who spread BRT, especially the Bogotá example (Wood, 2014, 2015).

Bogotá received over \$450 million USD in World Bank financing for TransMilenio and part of the funding agreements includes private sector involvement in service provision (Porter, 2010). The operating concession contract from the first phase of TransMilenio is used as an example in the World Bank's Public-Private Partnership in Infrastructure Resource Center. A sample contract is also included as an appendix of the Bus Rapid Transit Planning Guide prepared by the Institute for Transportation and Development Policy. They explicitly state the public-private partnership is a core principle of the effective BRT business model (Wright and Hook, 2007). The ability to build BRT around private sector involvement is considered one of its selling points for the World Bank and some BRT promoters (Finn, 2013; Gilbert, 2008).

When BRT systems were designed in Ahmedabad, India and Johannesburg, South Africa experts familiar with the Bogotá system recommended using the same type of administrative set-up, a public oversight body to contract out the operations to private companies. While there is informality in the transport sector in India, there is also a history of publicly owned bus companies. Ahmedabad has a municipal bus company providing bus service in the city, but the decision was made to follow the Bogotá model and contract out the BRT service. The idea was to have multiple bus companies competing to operate parts of the service, but as of 2014 there was only one company operating. As new BRT corridors open the existing public bus service is eliminated so it does not compete with the BRT service (which has a 150% higher fare). This is hurting the already financially struggling public bus company, which has been losing mode share since before the BRT system was implemented (Mahadevia et al., 2013).

Johannesburg has a strong informal public transport sector using minibus taxis. When setting up the BRT system, the government negotiated with the minibus taxi industry to set up a bus company to operate the service. An agreement was made with a bus company in Bogotá to partner with the new company in Johannesburg to

assist in setting up the company and initial operations (personal communication).

3.2. BRT as entrepreneurial urban governance

The primary motivation given for cities to build BRT projects is to improve mobility for their residents and to reduce the externalities of the informal system. But BRT projects are also being promoted as a means to be a 'world class' or sustainable city and as part of urban redevelopment efforts. As cities turn to entrepreneurial governance, competing with each other to attract global capital (Crossa, 2009), there are certain ideas of what it takes to be a world class or global city, including a high quality public transit system. This idea has taken hold across the developed and developing world; it is being used to promote public transport projects from Atlanta to Delhi.

Public transport is a public service, which contradicts the general concept of entrepreneurial urban governance definition that cities are focused on attracting mobile capital, not providing services. But not all public transport projects are designed and operated equally in terms of who they are serving. There is a tendency to build public transport projects not to improve access for the least mobile residents, but to improve the prestige of the city and to serve the transport needs of visitors and attract middle and high income residents back into the central city (Farmer, 2011).

While generally the world class city argument is used to promote rail based transit, some BRT projects are explicitly marketed as improving their city's status. According to NGO promoters of BRT, a key element is a distinctive brand for the system (Wright and Hook, 2007). The goal is to improve ridership and distinguish BRT as a better service than regular bus service. But the branding is also designed to create a sense of civic pride (in Ahmedabad it is called Janmarg or People's Way) and image for the city to market. A successful BRT system can help a city win international awards for urban sustainability (including one given by the main NGOs promoting BRT every year).

Bogotá has parlayed their investment in BRT along with bikeways, parks, and libraries to turn around their image as a city racked by crime and drug trafficking to an international example of urban sustainability and management (Wood, 2015). This achievement no doubt has helped cement it as the example to emulate when developing a BRT network.

The BRT project in Ahmedabad is part of an overall development process that includes a major redevelopment of the waterfront (Our Inclusive Ahmedabad, 2010). Critics of the Ahmedabad system use statistics of income of riders to show that it is not serving the transport needs of the lower third of the population, instead saying it was designed to serve middle class attractions like a redeveloped lake project (Mahadevia et al., 2013). Critics of the Line 4 BRT corridor in Mexico City, which connects the historic downtown to the international airport, claimed it was being built primarily to serve tourists and as part of an effort to 'clean-up' the historic center displacing street vendors and other parts of the informal economy (personal communication). Leaders in South Africa also saw BRT as a means to greater urban revitalization (Wood, 2015).

When BRT systems are developed as a closed system, meaning only special BRT buses can use the dedicated bus corridors, unless fully integrated with the existing bus system they create a two-tier network. Higher fares for BRT are required to not add public subsidies for operations. The result is that it is possible that BRT projects do not significantly improve accessibility for the lowest income urban residents.

Initially TransMilenio in Bogotá operated alongside the informal system. This created a two-tier fare structure with lower fares (both published rates and the ability to negotiate lower fares with drivers) in the informal system. Whether it is due to the higher fares (a significant percent of the income of the lowest income residents) or the design of the network in 2006 TransMilenio served middle income groups the most (Gilbert, 2008).

4. Contradictions and challenges

BRT is not inherently a neoliberal concept; it is being implemented as a neoliberal project. But even in that implementation, it is creating conditions that can challenge neoliberal ideas.

BRT projects are adding public funding to urban mass transport, in some cases where previously there had been none. In cities like Santiago this includes subsidies for operations, while in other cases the expenditure has been limited to funding for infrastructure, like the dedicated bus lanes and stations. The introduction of public funds creates the possibility for greater public accountability over the sector as it increases the 'publicness.' In addition, the regulation of the sector is an admission on the part of the state that the market fails to allocate the socially optimal level of service.

The new regulatory regime is changing the relationship between transit operators, the government, and the public. In the informal system, the relationship is between riders and operators; now the government acts as an intermediary. Private monopolies operate the service under government contracts that control the amount (and quality) of service provided. Much of the effort and literature by academics and policy-makers have been on determining the best contracts to align the public and private interests in the operation of the system. This leaves out the relationship between the public and the government and the public and the operators. These relationships have the potential to challenge the current contracting model.

In addition to the government acting as an intermediary, the use of public funds creates an opening for the public (citizens, tax-payers, bus riders) to claim a right to participate in the decision-making regardless of who operates the service. This requires 'the public' to recognize this change in publicness and demand accountability and transparency for both the funds and the contracts. Without institutional channels for input, these demands can end up as street protests against poor service and fare increases. In 2012–2014 protests over public transit broke out in various Brazilian cities, Mexico City, and Bogotá.

In March 2014, riders blocked BRT buses in Bogotá to protest overcrowded conditions. Similar protests occurred in 2012 as well. The mayor of Bogotá blamed the private operators and asked for public support to force a contract renegotiation to include crowding as one of the payment metrics (El Espectador, 2014b). However, this same mayor extended the contracts the previous year without adding this component or insisting on a competitive rebid in exchange for a cost saving to the city. But in response to the protests, he suggested a forum for input between riders, the government, and operators and that the operations should be in public control (El Espectador Redacción Bogotá, 2014). The operators insisted that decreasing overcrowding is not in their control and is the responsibility of the government since they determine scheduling (El Espectador, 2014a).

This example shows what can happen without a mechanism for public input, but also how the relationship between operators and the government can break-down in the face of public pressure over who is accountable to the public. These types of protests can lead to improved transit service. For example, the protests in Sao Paulo, Brazil in 2013 allowed the government to implement a plan to increase segregated bus only lanes. Occasional street protests are not the same as a seat at the decision-making table, but the new institutional arrangement presents an opportunity that was not available in the entirely informal bus sector.

At the same as creating an opening for collective action from transit riders, the formalization of the bus sector also increases the incentives for collective action for workers in the industry. Previously, drivers competed on the street with each other for passengers and worked long hours without benefits. Formalization can improve working conditions and increase the incentive to join unions in order to ensure conditions do improve.

The union for transport workers in South Africa sees the BRT in Johannesburg as an organizing opportunity, despite the (sometimes

violent) opposition to the BRT from the taxi industry. Former taxi workers were recruited to fill new BRT jobs and report the conditions are much better. The union continues to organize both the taxi and BRT workers (Barrett, 2010). Unions at bus operating companies in Santiago, Chile have held strikes for better working conditions.

However, formalization reduces the size of the workforce and existing workers are not always eligible for the new jobs. Union organizers in Bogotá expressed frustration that they were not included in the discussions over the creation of TransMilenio and stated that working conditions under the new system do not meet international standards, especially for the protection of union members (Porter, 2010).

BRT is a technology transfer between countries in the Global South. It demonstrates that they can create their own development models without copying the failed models from the Global North. The fundamental premise of BRT is allocating public space to bus users (and depending on the design to pedestrians and bicyclists). This is a challenge to automobility, the ubiquitous organizing of urban time and space around the private vehicle (Sheller and Urry, 2000). Prioritizing buses not only emphasizes collective instead of private individual transportation, but it is a more democratic allocation of public space. However, a real challenge to automobility requires governments to implement BRT in a manner that takes space from the powerful private vehicle users instead of taking space from other urban users on the sides of roads.

Not all cities implemented BRT using the Bogotá model. The designers of the BRT pilot corridor in Delhi, India were very deliberate to ensure their system would serve the lowest income residents. They saw the BRT in opposition to the Delhi Metro project, which was being built to improve Delhi's image as a 'world class' city. Instead of creating a closed network where only special (higher fare) BRT buses could operate, they chose to create an open corridor. The open corridor allows all buses (publicly and privately operated) to run in the exclusive bus lanes so no new bus company is required. However, technical difficulties with an open system and opposition from personal vehicle owners upset at what they saw as taking space from them caused the project to lose political support. Bus and cycle users organized to support the BRT corridor, but have not been successful in getting the corridors extended (Paget-Seekins, 2014).

BRT and the formalization of the bus sector can increase the power of residents by firmly putting transport in the public sphere; workers by increasing the incentives for collective action; and bus riders by prioritizing space for buses over cars, but it only creates an opening. Organizing is required to solidify this potential and to challenge the neoliberal implementation model for BRT. As shown in the case of Delhi a different model is possible, but maintaining political support for this model, especially as it confronts the power structure of automobility, is difficult.

5. Conclusion

BRT is being implemented within the neoliberal framework. The Bogotá model being marketed to developing cities around the world by development banks and NGOs is more than just design standards, it includes a public–private partnership operating model. Cities are addressing the informality in the urban bus sector by creating a market for purchasing bus service from large, private, in some cases international, companies. The government takes on the initial risk, guaranteeing payments to the private operators, and the reluctance for public subsidies to cover the costs of formalization creates higher fares. The fare and system design can limit the mobility benefits to the lowest income residents. In addition, some BRT projects are part of redevelopment efforts or designed and branded as part of their city's effort to attract mobile capital as a 'world class' or sustainable city.

This support Parnell and Robinson's claim that neoliberal projects can increase the role of the state and public spending in developing

cities and provide tangible benefits. Regardless of its neoliberal implementation, BRT and the formalization of the bus sector can improve mobility, safety, and air quality for urban residents. At the same time it points out the inherent contradictions in neoliberalism by creating more favorable grounds for collective action by increasing the publicness of public transport and the benefits of unionization for workers. And BRT can directly challenge one of the most powerful interests in urban development, the personal vehicle. This supports Peck, Theodore, and Brenner's claim that progressive re-appropriation is possible.

BRT is not inherently neoliberal but the dominant implementation model is. However, this model creates the openings through which more progressive urban policy can grow. The promise of BRT is a more democratic and affordable method of allocating public space and access to the city, but this will not happen without intentional action.

Acknowledgments

This work was supported by the Across Latitudes and Cultures – Bus Rapid Transit Centre of Excellence funded by the Volvo Research and Educational Foundations (VREF) and the Centro de Desarrollo Urbano Sustentable (CEDEUS) CONICYT/FONDAP grant number 15110020. I would like to thank Lake Sagaris and Jeremy Anderson for comments on the original draft and Matías Fernández for conducting interviews in Santiago and Mexico City.

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